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The  paper  aims  to  investigate  the  research  question  whether  the  US  2008 
crisis spilled over contagiously to the Baltic States  as  small  open economies. 
In  order  to  examine  the  evidence  of  financial contagion  as  a  systematic 
component  of  financial  risks  in  the  case  of  the  Baltic  States,  we  employ 
several  testing  methodologies  like  correlation  coefficients  based  methods 
adjusting also with possible heteroskedasticity and ARCH-GARCH framework. 
The results are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, stock returns’ correlations 
between  US  and  Baltic  States  increased  during  crisis  times,  confirming  the 
financial contagion hypothesis. On the other hand, volatility has not spilled over 
from  US  to  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  neither  have  volatility  spillovers 
become stronger after the crisis hit. 
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1. Introduction 
The events associated with the US 2008 crisis, which saw many countries 
falling into serious problems one after another like domino stones, reminded us 
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once again of the phenomenon of financial contagion as a systematic component 
of  financial  risks.  Financial  contagion  in  the  broadest  view  means  the 
transmission of a crisis from one economy to others which has often been quite 
unrelated  to  the  fundamental  problems  of  the  countries  and  markets  under 
observation. Contagious nature of financial crises undermines the risk-reducing 
potential of international portfolio diversification of international investors and 
makes countries vulnerable to the crises originating elsewhere. In the conditions 
of a highly global world the events that occur in one part of the world can have 
enormous impact on all markets and countries around the globe. 
Small open economies like the Baltic States are particularly vulnerable to 
global  economic  development.  Therefore  financial  contagion  analysis  is 
exceptionally important for these countries – EU new member countries with 
post-socialist path-dependence. 
Since  regaining  their  independence  in  1991,  the  Baltic  States  have 
undergone similar processes of economic, political and social transformation. 
Under the Washington Consensus policy framework these countries aimed to 
create stability and international trust as well as attractiveness for foreign direct 
investments  through  a  fixed  exchange  rate,  balanced  state  budget  and 
comparatively  low  tax  and  administrative  burdens.  In  the  late  1990s,  the 
transition and restructuring paradigms were replaced by the concepts of catching 
up and economic convergence to the level of the developed economies of the 
enlarged EU. Unfortunately, large amounts of foreign investment and private 
lending went into financing consumption and the real estate boom, and as a 
consequence  the  export  competitiveness  of  the  Baltic  economies  started  to 
weaken in the 2000s (see also Estonian Development Report 2008. Also, the 
deepening downturn in the main trading partners of the Baltic States during the 
recent global crisis has remarkably weakened the economic outlook for these 
countries. Estonia is the only country among the three Baltic States that joined 
the euro zone in 2011. Adopting the euro in itself is unlikely to trigger any major 
change in the pace of recovery, but it was expected during the joining that may 
remove  liquidity  risks,  add  stability  to  the  economy  and  help  attract  new 
investments.  These  small  countries  are  facing  a  double  challenge  to 
simultaneously overcome recent economic downturn as consequences of global 
economic crises as well as national economic policies.   
The paper aims to investigate the research question of whether the US 
2008  crisis  spilled  over  contagiously  to  the  Baltic  States  as  small  open 
economies. The essential aim of this study is to provide additional information 
for  elaborating  proposals  mitigating  or  even  avoiding  some  negative 
consequences of possible future crises’ spreading. 
In order to explore the evidence of financial contagion in the case of the 
Baltic States, we employ alternative testing methodologies like the correlation 
coefficients  based  methods  and  ARCH-GARCH  framework.  We  focus  on FINANCIAL CONTAGION OF THE 2008 CRISIS   63 
 
examining  the evidence  of  financial contagion  from  the  US to the  Estonian, 
Latvian and Lithuanian stock markets. The data set employed for the analysis 
includes daily closing prices of the US (Standard & Poor’s 500), Estonian (OMX 
Tallinn), Latvian (OMX Riga) and Lithuanian (OMX Vilnius) stock markets’ 
indices over the time period from February 29th 2008 to March 9th 2009. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the following part of the paper we give a 
short overview of several considerations and discussions regarding the concept 
of financial contagion. The next parts of the paper present information about 
data and research methodology and the main research results. The paper ends  
with conclusions and discussion. 
 
2. Financial contagion 
The concept “contagion” is borrowed from epidemiology.  In economic 
literature  it  is  ordinarily  considered  as  the  transmission  of  crisis  from  on 
economy to others and usually some further restrictions have been made (see 
alternative  definitions  below).  Financial  contagion  has  become  increasingly 
popular  research  task  in  the  recent  decades  when  several  crises  transmitted 
rapidly to other countries in 1980’s, 1990’s and in the current century. Many of 
the countries that have got hit by the crisis’ snowball are rather different in terms 
of size and economic structure as compared to the country of origin of a crisis. 
The  most  comprehensive  information  about  several  approaches  to  the 
concept of “financial contagion”, the transmission channels of financial crisis, 
and the results of empirical studies focused on financial contagion is provided by 
the Word Bank Group (2009) on their special website. According to the World 
Bank  approach  there  are  three  main  alternative  definitions  of  financial 
contagion: 
  Contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-
country  spillover  effects  which  have  been  emphasized  during  the  crisis 
times.  Contagion  can  be  observed  through  co-movements  of  different 
financial indices in different countries or rising probabilities of default if 
crisis  occurs  elsewhere.  So,  unlike  other  definitions  this  one  includes 
fundamental linkage as a channel of contagion. 
  Contagion  is  the  transmission  of  shocks  to  other  countries  or  the  cross-
country correlation, beyond any fundamental link among the countries and 
beyond common shocks. For example Masson (2004) defines contagion as 
only those transmissions of crises that cannot be identified with observed 
changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Going for somewhat other testing 
methodology Eichengreen et al (1996) argue that there is contagion if the 
probability  of  a  crisis  in  a  given  country  increases  conditional  on  the 
occurrence  of  a  crisis  elsewhere,  if  the  standard  set  of  macroeconomic 
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excess co-movement – a correlation that remains even after controlling for 
fundamentals and common shocks.  Herding behaviour is usually argued to 
be  responsible  for  that  more-than-expected  co-movement.  Fundamental 
linkages are distinguished from contagion by most of the literature. 
  Contagion  occurs  when  cross-country  correlations  increase  during  "crisis 
times"  relative  to  correlations  during  "tranquil  times."  Or  as  Forbes  and 
Rigobon (2001) put it: contagion is a significant increase in cross-market 
linkages  after  a  shock.  This  definition  is  sometimes  referred  as  shift-
contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2001 and 2002) stress that this notion of 
contagion  excludes  a  constant  high  degree  of  co-movement  in  a  crisis 
period. In this case, markets are just interdependent. 
As argued by Didier, Mauro and Schmukler (2008), the factors underlying 
the channels that generated contagion during the crises of the 1990s seem to be 
potentially at least as strong today as they were a decade ago. One of the main 
interests  of  contagion  studies  is  associated  to  the  merits  of  international 
diversification.  Although  the  rationale  is  that  theoretically  international 
diversification should significantly reduce the portfolio risk, when cross country 
correlations increase during crises much of the rationale is undermined. Besides, 
questions about appropriate financial architecture and investment opportunities 
and risks to local markets can be answered by studies of financial contagion. 
The  results  of  previous  empirical  studies  about  empirical  evidence  of 
financial  contagion  (see  also  overview  of  Kuusk  and  Paas  2011)  are 
heterogeneous.  They  differ  depending  on  several  circumstances,  like  chosen 
conceptual definition of contagion and even in the most widely used approach of 
focusing on co-movements in asset prices. There are also substantial differences 
in study results depending on whether correlations are adjusted for the presence 
of heteroskedasticity or not. Chosen crisis, time periods, destination countries 
and  even  the  financial  market  under  investigation  may  affect  the  results  of 
empirical  studies.  In  addition,  the  problems  of  omitted  variables,  feedback 
dependencies between stock markets, different time zones, and arbitrary choices 
of the crisis window can all affect tests of contagion (see also Billio and Pellizon 
(2003) and Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001)). 
The variability of empirical results of studies on financial contagion can 
also be explained by several measuring problems. For instance, Rigobon (2002) 
points out that contagion have been associated with high frequency events; it has 
been measured on stock market returns, interest rates, exchange rates, or linear 
combinations  of  them.  Rigobon  argues  that  the  data  is  plagued  with 
simultaneous  equations,  omitted  variables,  conditional  and  unconditional 
heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, non-linearity and non-normality problems. 
Naively  counting  numbers  examining  several  aspects  of  contagion  we  can 
conclude  that  evidence  for  contagion  during  financial  crises  has  been  found 
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the presence of heteroskedasticity is not taken into account. The studies that 
account  for  heteroskedasticity  find  evidence  for  financial  contagion  far  less 
often. This diversity of results is well illustrated by the research by Daniel Serwa 
(2005) who used four different testing methodologies and different samples to 
achieve  mixed  results.  According  to  his  findings  contagion  is  a  rather  rare 
phenomenon, but patterns of capital and information flow to stock markets still 
change during turbulent periods. 
In addition, the previous literature relating to issues of financial contagion 
does not always have consensus on the issue whether the recent crises have been 
more contagious than those before 1990’s. While some authors (Haile and Pozo 
2008) argue that currency crises prior to 1990s did not appear to spread across 
countries with the virulence and speed observed recently, the others (Bordo and 
Murshid 1999 and 2000) have found no evidence to confirm that. 
We  agree  with  the  problems  stressed  in  the  literature  considering  financial 
contagion  and  rely  on  the  viewpoints  presented  in  the  analysed  studies 
discussing some of them in the next part of our paper. We rely on the definition 
given by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who distinguish between contagion and 
interdependence and define contagion as an excessive transmission of shocks 
from  crisis  stock  market  to  other  stock  markets,  beyond  any  idiosyncratic 
disturbances and  fundamental links among  them. According  to the  definition 
used in this paper, financial contagion, unlike interdependence, means that there 
are  breaks  in  the  international  transmission  mechanism  owing  to  financial 
panics, herding or switches of investors' expectations. Accordingly, contagion 
requires a change in the structure of stock market linkages and in the case of 
contagion  the  increase  in  these  linkages  during  crises  has  to  be  statistically 
significant. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. The correlation coefficients based method 
In the empirical part of our paper we employ two main approaches for 
testing hypotheses regarding possible financial contagion from the US to the 
Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the crisis that started in US in 
2008.  First,  we  implement  the  correlation  coefficients  based  methods,  and 
second, the ARCH-GARCH framework. 
Employing  the  correlation  based  analysis  we  investigate  stock  indices 
from  March  3-rd  2008  until March 9-th  2009 and choose  the bankruptcy  of 
Lehman  Brothers  in  September  15,  2008  as  the  starting  point  of  the  crisis. 
According to this approach, the period from March 3-rd 2008 to September 15-
th 2008 will be considered as a tranquil period and the period from September 
16-th 2008 to March 9-th 2009 as crisis period. The use of stock indices is 
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accessible data compared to other variables such as comparable interest rates, 
bonds or exchange rates. Also, the stock market data is available on a daily basis, 
which  makes  it  easier  to  have  reasonable  number  of  observations  for  the 
analysis. 
As our choice of the starting point of a crisis is clear, the chosen starting 
point of a tranquil period and the ending point of a crisis period need some 
further explanation.  We have chosen March 9-th 2009 as the ending date of a 
crisis period, because it was the local minimum for S&P500 during crisis. This 
kind of logic is previously used by Mishkin and White (2003) and Serwa (2005). 
The tranquil period cannot be considered to stretch for too long because we do 
not want any structural breaks during that time. There was quite a sharp fall in 
the S&P500 index at the end of February, 2008, which stopped at the beginning 
of March. So, we took March 3
rd as the first trading day in March (March 1
st  and 
2
nd were at weekend) for our starting date of a tranquil period. This approach 
also allowed us to have tranquil and crisis period with relatively similar length. 
As noted by Billio and Pellizon (2003) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
correlation based analysis is more suitable than other approaches to shed light on 
the issues of international diversification, the role of international institutions 
and bail-out funds, as well as propagation mechanisms. 
We test the hypothesis whether the 2008 financial crisis has spilled over 
contagiously  from  US  to  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania.  The  logic  of  the 
following tests is based on the assumption that contagion occurs when, if a crisis 
in  the  US,  correlation  is  stronger  because  of  some  structural  change  in  the 
international  economy  affecting  the  links  across  markets.  Relying  on  this 
hypothesis and data sample, we consider contagion as significant increase in the 
correlation coefficient in stock returns between the  country of origin of the 
crisis  (the  US)  and  the  country  of  destination  (Estonia,  Latvia  or  Lithuania) 
during the crisis compared to the non-crisis period. 
Similarly to many earlier papers (for example Forbes and Rigobon 2002) we 
consider a model, where stock returns on the country of origin of the crisis are 
independent variable and influence returns on the country of destination. More 
specifically, we use the following linear model (see Forbes and Rigobon 2002 
and Serwa and Bohl 2005) 
                   (1) 
                                                     (2), 
where  xt  are  stock  returns  in  the  crisis  market  (US)  that  are  exogenous  and 
influence returns on the calm market yt (Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania); 
  and  are idiosyncratic shocks to the respective stock markets. 
It is assumed that volatility of stock returns on the crisis market changes 
during crisis times, but the model parameters and the volatility of idiosyncratic 
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We estimate the  correlation coefficient in both tranquil and crisis times 
and then control for the significant increase in the correlation coefficient after 
crisis hits. 
The correlation coefficient for the calm period is given by the equation 
  (3) 
and for the crisis period 
  (4) 
 
We agree with Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who show that correlation is 
conditional on the volatility of stock returns in the crisis market and therefore, 
the correlation between stock returns in crisis and non-crisis country may rise 
even when contagion does not occur. Thus, it is not fully correct to test for 
contagion  using  simple  correlations  that  to  not  take  into  account  increased 
volatility during crises. Therefore we consider that the testing approach with 
heteroskedasticity  adjustment  in  post-crisis  correlations  seems  to  be  more 
reliable. 
Thus,  estimating  correlation  coefficients  we  also  adjust  for 
heteroskedasticity  by  using    the  Forbes  and  Rigobon  (2002)    approach  who 
propose an adjustment so that the correlation coefficient does not depend on the 
volatility of returns in the crisis market: 
                            .                        (5) 
is the correlation coefficient between the crisis and the non-crisis market 
observed during the crisis period. 
The  parameter  represents  the  relationship  between  the  variances  of  stock 
returns  from  the  crisis  country  during  the  turmoil  period,  and 
during the calm period,  : 
                                                                   (6) 
 
We start with estimating simple correlations and later use the adjustments 
proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). The correlation coefficients (both not 
adjusted and adjusted) are transformed through a Fisher transformation, so that 
they are approximately normally distributed. This transformation is necessary in 
order  to  have  relevant  results  from  the  hypotheses  controlling  (Dungey  and 
Zhumabekova 2001, Jokipii and Lucey 2006, Lee et al. 2007). 
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3.2. The ARCH-GARCH framework 
Although  easy  to  use  and  providing  some  other  advantages,  the 
correlation  coefficients  based  methods  also  have  several  drawbacks.  For 
example, as it is demonstrated by Baur contagion tests that base on correlation 
coefficient,  it  can  be  misleading  when  correlations  are  time-varying  and 
volatility is contagious per se (Baur 2003). 
In  order  to  check  for  the  robustness  of  the  empirical  results  we  also 
implement  the  autoregressive  conditionally  heteroskedastic  (ARCH)  and 
generalised ARCH  (GARCH)  framework  of  statistical  models  to  explore the 
possible contagion from the US stock market (S&P 500) to the Baltic States 
stock  markets.  The  same  framework  to  investigate  contagion  in  emerging 
markets is used for example by Edwards and Susmel (2001 and 2003). 
According to French et al (1987) a member of ARCH family, GARCH-M, 
is a good representation of the daily stock-return behaviour in the US because of 
its successful capturing of effects of time-varying volatility on a expected return 
of a stock. 
We  investigate  two  main  hypotheses.  Firstly,  we  test  whether  price 
changes  in  the  US  stock  market  influence  prices  in  the  Baltic  States  stock 
markets, and secondly, we explore whether changes in price volatility in the US 
stock market are related to changes in price volatility in the Baltic States stock 
markets. In order to test these hypotheses we examine daily stock returns in US 
and Baltic stock markets over the period, March 3, 2008, to March 9, 2009. For 
the US stock market we use Standard & Poor’s Composite Index, for Estonia we 
use OMXT, for Latvia OMXR and for Lithuania OMXV indices. We focus on 
average two-day returns to control for the fact that markets in different countries 
are  not  open  during  the  same  hours  (for  how  to  avoid  the  problem  of 
nonsynchronous trading periods for different markets, see Lin, Engle and Ito 
1994). Our sample period includes September 2008 when one of the most severe 
stock market crashes in history took place. To investigate the contagion effect we 
have estimated our models over two sub-periods, before and after the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy in September 15, 2008. 
We use many extensions of the basic ARCH model that was developed by 
Engle (1982) and generalized to GARCH model by Bollerslev (1986). Firstly, 
we  allow  the  conditional  mean  to  be  a  function  of  the  conditional  variance, 
which was first proposed by Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). This extension 
gives us the GARCH(1,1)-M model. 
Secondly,  we  use  the  extension  first  given  by  French,  Schwert  and 
Stambaugh (1987), who adjusted the conditional mean return for a first-order 
moving average. This is done mainly because of nonsynchronous trading in the 
US and Baltic States which is problematic in the ARCH family of models (see 
for example Cohen et al 1980). FINANCIAL CONTAGION OF THE 2008 CRISIS   69 
 
Third,  we  include  a  dummy  variable  into  the  model,  which  helps  to 
capture the fact that there are no price movements at weekends. This weekends' 
influence that gives Mondays somewhat special status is well known in literature 
(see French 1980, Gibbons and Hess 1981 and others) and is called Monday 
effects. 
And  finally,  we  include  stock  returns  in  crisis  market  as  explanatory 
variable into the non-crisis market's stock returns' equation. 
Thus, we implement the MA(1)-GARCH(1, 1)-M model given by the formula: 
                                   (7) 
                                   (8) 
 
where 
Xt – stock index return in non-crisis market at time t; 
 bt – conditional variance of the R at time t; 
D – dummy variable for Monday effect (D takes value of 1 on days following 
weekends and holidays and is 0 otherwise); 
Yt – stock index return in crisis market at time t, ut and ut-1 are error terms at time 
t and t-1 respectively; 
Zt – squared residual derived from an MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)-M model applied to 
the returns of US stock market. 
This kind of model is first proposed by Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990). 
As we do not have Zt we first have to estimate the equation 
                                             (9) 
                                   (10) 
from where we derive needed squared residual. 
The empirical results of our study are presented in the next part of the paper. 
 
  3.3. Empirical results 
In  the  empirical  section  of  the  paper,  we  first  compare  the  correlation 
coefficients between stock returns of the US (a crisis country) and Baltic States 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) during the non-crisis and crisis period. Secondly, 
we measure changes in volatility to examine whether conditional means and 
conditional  variances  of  financial  variables  are  related  to  each  other  among 
countries during the crisis period. Investigation is based on the methodology 
outlined in the previous section and uses the data and time periods that are also 
explained in the previous section 3. We use two-day average rolling log stock 
returns to control for non-synchronous trading hours in the US and Baltic States. 
The number of observations used is 266. All stock indices used are denominated 
in US dollars. 
Unadjusted correlation coefficients are calculated using formulas 3 and 4 in 
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and third row (post-crisis correlations) in the following table 1. The final row in 
table 1 is obtained by adjusting the unadjusted post-crisis correlations given in 
the  previous  row  by  the  adjustment  procedure  given  by  the  formula  5  (see 
section 3). 
In  the  empirical  section  of the paper,  we  first  compare  the correlation 
coefficients between stock returns of the US (a crisis country) and Baltic States 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) during the non-crisis and crisis period. Secondly, 
we measure changes in volatility to examine whether conditional means and 
conditional  variances  of  financial  variables  are  related  to  each  other  among 
countries during the crisis period. Investigation is based  on the methodology 
outlined in the previous section and uses the data and time periods that are also 
explained in the previous section 3. We use two-day average rolling log stock 
returns to control for non-synchronous trading hours in the US and Baltic States. 
The number of observations used is 266. All stock indices used are denominated 
in US dollars. 
Unadjusted correlation coefficients are calculated using formulas 3 and 4 
in  the  previous  section.  The  results  are  given  in  the  second  (pre-crisis 
correlations) and third row (post-crisis correlations) in the following table 1. The 
final  row  in  table  1  is  obtained  by  adjusting  the  unadjusted  post-crisis 
correlations given in the previous row by the adjustment procedure given by the 
formula 5 (see section 3). 
Table1. Correlation coefficients between US and Baltic stock markets 
  US and Estonia  US and Latvia  US and Lithuania 
Pre-crisis  0.169  0.112  0.186 
Post-crisis, unadjusted  0.435  0.294  0.477 
Post-crisis, adjusted  0.286  0.191  0.315 
Source: authors’ calculations. Sample size is 266 observations. 
As  seen  in table  1,  the  correlation  coefficient  for  the  pre-crisis  period 
(after Fischer transformation) between the US and Estonia is 0.169, between the 
US and Latvia 0.112 and between US and Lithuania 0.186. The corresponding 
simple correlations for the crisis period are 0.435, 0.294 and 0.477, and they are 
statistically significant. It is seen that post-crisis correlations are significantly 
higher which is confirmed only by the t-test. This finding supports the contagion 
hypothesis according to which linkages between crisis and non-crisis countries 
have become stronger after the starting point of a crisis. Thus, there has to have 
been  some  changes  in  the  structure  of  stock  market  linkages  which  can  be 
explained  by  herding  behaviour  or  switches  in  investors’  expectations  and 
attitude. 
However, as pointed out in the previous section 3, the higher correlation 
coefficients in this simple model may be caused by the higher volatility that is 
present  during  the  crisis  times.  Because  of  this  bias  we  adjust  crisis  times FINANCIAL CONTAGION OF THE 2008 CRISIS   71 
 
correlations to the higher volatility bias. After doing this (adjusting post-crisis 
correlations for  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity)  the  correlations are  much 
lower,  0.286  for  Estonia,  0.191  for  Latvia  and  0.315  for  Lithuania  but  still 
statistically  significant.  So  it  is  clearly  seen  that  not  adjusting  for 
heteroskedasticity increases the probability to find supporting evidence for the 
existence  of  financial  contagion.  Still,  in  all  three  cases  the  post-crisis 
correlations are more than 1.5 times higher than pre-crisis correlations and we 
can deduce that there has been some kind of structural break in the financial 
shocks’ transmission mechanism, although not quite as strong as suggested by 
the simple unadjusted correlations. 
It is expected that the countries´ level of volatility will increase in more 
turbulent times. It means that conditional and unconditional variances may be 
changing  over  time.  In  order  to  capture  better  picture  of  the  contagion  it  is 
assumed that there are two regimes in the volatility where one regime associates 
to lower volatility, tranquil times, and the other to high volatility, so the called 
turbulent times. So to test for contagion we used as second approach an ARCH 
or  GARCH  framework  for  estimating  the  variance-covariance  transmission 
mechanism  across  viewed  countries.  The  used  methodology  is  given  by  the 
formulas 7-10 in the previous section 3.  Following Table 2 shows the results of 
the model estimation. 
Starting with the pre-crisis period it is seen that statistically significant 
mean  spillover  effects  (see  values  of  sigma  in  the Table  2)  are  observed  in 
Estonian and Lithuanian but not in the  Latvian stock market. It means that the 
conditional  mean  return  in  Estonian  and  Lithuanian  stock  market  exhibits  a 
positive spillover effect from the US stock market – high (low) return in the S&P 
500 index is followed by a high (low) return in the OMXT and OMXV, but such 
relation is not found between S&P 500 and OMXR. It is an interesting finding 
for which we do not have good theoretical explanation. 
Table 2. The results of estimating the MA(1)-GARCH(1, 1)-M model for the 
spillover effects between US and Baltic States stock markets. 
  From US to Estonia  From US to Latvia  From US to Lithuania 
  non-crisis  crisis  non-crisis  crisis  non-crisis  crisis 
ʱ  -0.002*  -0.01*  0.002  -0.01*  -0.002  -0.001 
β  11.53  16.24*  -32.34  9.27  15.72  -0.99 
γ  -0.004  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002 
δ  0.15*  0.20*  0.07  0.14  0.14*  0.20* 
ε  0.13  0.06  -0.25*  -0.13  0.09  0.03 
a  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
b  1.05*  -0.17  0.68*  0.07  0.50*  0.67* 
c  -0.004  0.49*  0.08  0.32*  0.38*  0.27* 
d  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000* 
f  -0.02*  0.02  0.09  0.09  -0.08  -0.001 
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The coefficients are estimated from the  MA(1)-GARCH(1, 1)-M model 
 
  , where 
Xt – stock index return in non-crisis market at time t; 
 bt – conditional variance of the R at time t; 
D – dummy variable for Monday effect (D takes value of 1 on days following 
weekends and holidays and is 0 otherwise); 
Yt – stock index return in crisis market at time t, ut and ut-1 are error terms at time 
t and t-1 respectively; 
Zt – squared residual derived from an MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)-M model applied to 
the returns of US stock market. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
* statistically significant at 5% level. 
 
Turning attention to the crisis period it is seen that mean spillover effects 
are now stronger in all three markets. In the crisis period mean spillover effects 
are statistically significant even between US and Latvian stock markets if 0.1 
confidence level is used. This finding is in line with the contagion hypothesis as 
post-crisis linkages seem to be stronger than those in pre-crisis period. 
We also investigate spillover effects in conditional variance (see values of 
f  in Table  3).  Unlike  conditional  mean conditional variance  does not  exhibit 
statistically significant positive spillovers in any of the observed markets, nor in 
the crisis period neither in the non-crisis period. The only statistically significant 
spillover effect is observed in Estonian stock market in pre-crisis period and it is 
negative. Thus high volatility in the S&P 500 index does not give any reason to 
expect  that  we  will  see  high  volatility  also  in  Baltic  stock  markets.  The 
conditional variance spillover effects are not stronger in the crisis period than in 
the  non-crisis  period.  This  means  that  no  structural  breaks  in  volatility 
transmission  mechanisms  are  observed  and  thus  no  support  for  contagion 
hypothesis is found. 
Summarizing the findings of the empirical section we can say that the 
results of the correlation coefficients based and the volatility spillovers based 
method  are  somewhat  contradictory.  Correlations  in  returns  on  stock  indices 
between US and Baltic States stock markets are clearly higher during turmoil 
period  compared  to  tranquil  period,  which  is  supporting  evidence  on  the 
contagion hypothesis. On the other hand the estimation results of the MA(1)-
GARCH(1,  1)-M  model  while  showing  some  increasing  spillover  effects  on 
conditional mean, did not show any sign neither positive nor increasing during 
crisis times spillover effects on conditional variance. 
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4. Conclusions and discussion 
The paper examines whether there has been financial contagion from US 
to the three Baltic States during the 2008 financial crisis by using stock returns 
data during time period from March 3-rd 2008 until March 9-th 2009. Financial 
crises and their contagion have been long studied and modelled by economists 
and several alternative definitions of financial contagion have been used. This 
paper  defines  contagion  as  a  structural  break  in  the  linear  transmission 
mechanism of financial shocks and applies both correlation coefficients based 
tests and ARCH-GARCH framework to test for financial contagion. 
Correlation  coefficients  based  testing  reveals  supporting  evidence  on 
financial contagion. The unadjusted (for the presence of heteroskedasticity) post-
crisis  correlation  between  the  US  and  all  three  Baltic  countries  is  quite 
significantly higher than the pre-crisis correlation, which supports the contagion 
hypothesis  and  indicates  that  linkages  between  the  US  (crisis  country)  and 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (non-crisis countries) have become stronger after  
September 15-th, 2008 which was agreed upon as the starting date of a crisis. 
Because  of  the  bias  of  unadjusted  correlation  coefficients  towards 
overestimating  contagion  effects,  we  adjust  crisis  times  correlations  for  the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. Using these adjusted correlations the differences 
between pre- and post-crisis correlations are much smaller but still more than 1.5 
times in favour of post-crisis correlations. 
The  results  of  the  MA(1)-GARCH(1,1)-M  model  are  mixed.    Mean 
spillover effects from US to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are stronger during 
the  crisis  period  as  compared  to  the  tranquil  period.    During  crisis  times 
conditional  mean  return  in  all  three  Baltic  stock  markets  exhibits  a  positive 
spillover effect from the US stock market. This is not true for the conditional 
variance, which does not exhibit statistically significant positive spillovers in 
any  of  the  observed  markets,  or  in  the  crisis  period  either  in  the  non-crisis 
period. Further, there is no sign for the positive spillovers of conditional variance 
to  strengthen  during  crisis  times. These  results  also  confirm  once  again  that 
financial contagion is a complex phenomenon and examining it needs further 
investments into employment and development of study methods.  
The contagious transmission of crisis from the US to the Baltic States 
stock  markets  (and  economy)  that  the  correlation  coefficients  based  testing 
indicated somewhat undermines the rationale of  the merits of international risk 
diversification  and  shows  the  risks  that  small  open  economies  have  to  face. 
However, although in 2009 the Baltic States faced similar problems to Greece’s 
in the recent crisis, they managed to overcome this problem with the help of 
several retrenches. The rating agency Standard & Poor’s has increased all three 
countries rating outlook bringing out the reason of success in decreasing the 
budget. Thus, one can judge that the infection was not especially hard for the 
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larger  problems.  Not  so  great  susceptibility  to  financial  contagion  of  Baltic 
countries was also indicated by the testing of spillover effects of conditional 
variance, which revealed that in spite of being extremely open economies the 
Baltic countries stock markets do not exhibit a positive variance spillover effect 
from the US stock market and the presence of the 2000 crisis-in the US did not 
make these spillovers significantly stronger. 
Thus, small open economies like Baltic States do not seem to be more 
susceptible to financial crises than other countries and should probably continue 
to be as open as possible for  both foreign trade and investment, an aspect which 
has been one of the main reasons for their success story so far. In order to deal 
with some unavoidable contagion from elsewhere, government interventions to 
direct knowledge and innovation based development which could enable better 
mitigation of the negative consequences of crises are probably necessary. 
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